Political business cycles at the municipal level by Veiga, Linda Gonçalves & Veiga, Francisco José
 
 
Political Business Cycles at the Municipal Level 
Linda Gonçalves Veiga 
Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) 
Universidade do Minho 
 
Francisco José Veiga 
Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) 
Universidade do Minho 
 
Abstract: 
 
This article tests for the existence of rational political business cycles models using a 
large and unexplored data set of Portuguese municipalities. The data set is well-suited 
for this purpose because it provides a high level of detail on expenditure items, because 
Portuguese municipalities are homogeneous with respect to policy instruments and 
institutions and follow an exogenously determined election schedule. Estimation results 
clearly reveal the existence of opportunistic behaviour by local governments. 
Expenditures increase in pre-election periods, especially on items that are highly visible 
to the electorate (e.g., highways and streets). This suggests an effort to signal 
competence and improve chances of re-election. 
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1. Introduction 
This article reports on tests of rational political business cycle (PBC) models 
using an extensive new data set covering all Portuguese mainland municipalities. With a 
panel of observations for budget balances and expenditure items over the 1979-2000 
periods, it is possible to examine the fiscal choices of local governments over a number 
of electoral cycles. Thus, we can check whether incumbent politicians increase 
municipal spending in pre-election periods. Although most previous studies of political 
business cycles have employed macro-level time series data, the examination of 
municipal government decisions is motivated by rational political business cycles of the 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) type. In those models, incumbents increase spending relative 
to taxes in pre-election periods as a signal of competence in the presence of imperfect 
information. This signaling motivation should apply to incumbent politicians at local, as 
well as national levels. Using this data, we can also investigate if expenditure choices 
are affected by the timing of national elections and if the opportunistic cycle in spending 
is influenced by the mayor’s ideology, the support she enjoys at the municipal 
assembly, and by her decision to run for another term in office. 
 Use of data for Portuguese municipalities1 is motivated by the fact that they 
constitute a very good laboratory to test for the existence of rational political business 
cycles. First, data on public expenditures are very detailed, allowing for tests of PBC on 
particular expenditure categories. Second, the institutional structure of local 
governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all localities, making 
this panel preferable to one composed of several countries, or states, with different 
institutions and policy instruments. Third, election dates are fixed and defined 
exogenously from the perspective of the local authorities, and all municipalities have 
elections in the same day. Finally, because the data set is large (with a maximum of 278 
cross-sections and 22 years of observations), inferences are likely to be more revealing 
that those obtained with smaller panels of countries and/or states.  
Our empirical results provide clear evidence of opportunistic behaviour by 
mayors (Presidentes de Câmara), evidenced by pre-election increases in expenditure 
items highly visible to the electorate, such as investment expenditures on overpasses, 
streets and complementary works and rural roads. Econometric tests also demonstrate 
that the dimension of the opportunistic cycle in expenditures does not depend on 
                                                 
1 Since there are no states or administrative regions in mainland Portugal, the municipalities are the 
largest governmental entities below the national government. 
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whether the mayor’s party has a majority of deputies in the municipal assembly or on 
whether the incumbent runs for another term in office. However, the cycle’s magnitude 
seems to be influenced by ideology; namely left-wing oriented mayors tend to behave 
more opportunistically than right-wing ones. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature 
on political business cycles. Section 3 presents a short digression on municipalities and 
describes the dataset. The empirical strategy used to investigate the impact of elections 
on municipal budgets and expenditures is explained in section 4 and the results obtained 
are presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions are reported in section 6. 
 
2. Political business cycles and municipal governments 
The theory of political business cycles (PBC) originated with Nordhaus (1975), 
who proposed a model in which incumbent politicians would manipulate the economy 
to gain electoral advantage. The model presumed that expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies would produce a pre-election boom, lowering the unemployment rate, and that 
myopic voters would respond by supporting the incumbent party with a favorable vote. 
Given the formulation of the model’s expectational Phillips curve, inflationary 
consequences of the pre-election expansion were largely delayed until after the election, 
when policy would switch to a more contractionary stance. The Nordhaus model 
generated much interest and research, but ultimately was a victim of the rational 
expectations revolution. Nordhaus assumed that voters’ expectations were formed 
adaptatively; i.e., they were based on what voters had recently observed. Pre-election 
stimulus created “favorable” conditions only because the public failed to anticipate the 
stimulus and its ultimate consequences. In essence, voters were repeatedly tricked in 
successive electoral cycles. 
In the years following Nordhaus’s contribution, the assumption of adaptative 
expectations has become regarded as untenable in economic theory; the idea that voters 
would be tricked in the same fashion in repeated elections seems especially improbable. 
Instead, the assumption of rational expectations, which rules out systematic 
expectational errors, has become the norm. However, the political business cycle model 
did not die, but was rehabilitated in a rational expectations environment. Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) developed an explanation for the PBC in which asymmetric information 
replaced voter myopia in explaining electoral cycles in economic policies. In their 
model, voters have rational expectations, but are unsure of the “competence” of 
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politicians (here competence refers to an ability to produce public output with fewer 
inputs; i.e., at lower cost). Their model can produce an equilibrium in which incumbent 
politicians increase government spending in pre-election periods in an effort to signal 
competence. The Rogoff-Sibert model was a welcome contribution for researchers with 
an empirical interest in political business cycles. Although the implications of the model 
for cycles in outcomes (as opposed to policies) were ambiguous, the possibility existed, 
and the necessity for the adaptative expectations assumption was obviated.2 
Most empirical research on political business cycles has made use of national-
level data on elections, policies, and economic outcomes. For research based on the 
Nordhaus model, this was a natural consequence of the development of the theory. The 
model posited that voters looked at macroeconomic conditions, specifically 
unemployment and inflation, and that politicians controlled them. Naturally, 
macroeconomic variables were the object of empirical studies of the PBC as well. With 
the arrival of the Rogoff-Sibert reconstruction, empirical research did not fundamentally 
change its direction. The existence of the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) model provided 
justification for continued interest in the political business cycle, but its major effect 
was to provide improved theoretical underpinnings rather than to change the way in 
which political business cycle studies were empirically implemented. 
Importantly, the Rogoff-Sibert model is distinguished by the assumption that 
voters evaluate efficiency in public production. At the local government level, 
production of public services like fire protection, education, and public safety is a 
principal activity; it follows that the Rogoff-Sibert model should apply at local 
governmental levels. It is probably more difficult to argue that voters try to assess 
“efficiency” in production of national defense, foreign affairs, income redistribution, or 
legal institutions, which are important concerns of national governments. Thus, the 
Rogoff-Sibert model is not only applicable to the behavior of local governments; it may 
be most applicable at that level. In fact, already at the beginning of the 1990’s Rogoff 
highlighted the advantages of research on state or local governments: 
 
“The equilibrium political budget cycle theory suggests that it would be 
more promising to focus empirical research on testing for electoral 
cycles in taxes, transfers, and government consumption spending. For 
                                                 
2 Other important early contributions to the rational opportunistic business cycles literature were 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff (1990) and Person and Tabellini (1990). 
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these variables, one can also look at data for state and local elections, 
instead of concentrating solely on the small number of observations 
available for national elections” (Rogoff, 1990: 33-34). 
 
In contrast, the Nordhaus model typically would not apply well to municipalities. Local 
governments have little ability to stimulate employment through expenditures, since 
much of the employment impact of added spending will be felt outside of the locality. 
The impact of local decisions on inflation rates is even smaller.3   
One of the first studies that followed Rogoff’s suggestion was Blais and Nadeau 
(1992), which tested the existence of political fiscal cycles in ten Canadian provinces, 
from 1951 to 1984. Results suggested the existence of a short electoral cycle, only in the 
year before the election, and mainly visible on social services and road expenditures. 
According to these authors, there are no substantial differences in the magnitude of local 
governments’ opportunistic behaviour that can be attributable to ideology, the duration 
of terms, or tenure in office. 
Using data from local governments in Israel, Rosenberg (1992) presented a 
model where the value of public expenditures over a term in office is influenced by the 
re-election motive and also by the personal financial situation of the incumbent if he 
loses the election.4 Tests implemented on development expenditures of ten Israeli 
towns, using annual data from 1964 to 1982, confirmed his hypothesis. 
Some other studies have been published about countries including the U.S., 
Germany, and Sweden.5 However, the Portuguese case has received little attention at 
both at the national and sub-national levels.6 Since Portugal is a relatively new 
democracy, the problem of an insufficient number of observations to perform 
aggregated analysis is more severe than in most countries. This provides added 
motivation for a focus on municipalities. 
                                                 
3 The Nordhaus model is not completely irrelevant for local governments. Local government expenditures 
can have effects on local unemployment, for example, especially if labor is immobile. 
4 In this case, public expenditure manipulation has in mind an increase in employment opportunities in 
the private sector, or even a direct transfer of income trough the allocation of contracts to firms in the 
private sector. According to the model, incumbents that decide not to run again for office increase public 
expenditures before the elections more than those that try to be re-elected.  
5 For an extended and updated revision of the empirical literature about the U.S. see Besley and Case 
(2003). For studies about Germany see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). For Sweden see 
Petterson-Lidbom (2001). 
6 Regarding local governments, see the working papers of Baleiras and Costa (2001), and Veiga (2002). 
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3. Portuguese municipalities: brief characterization and sources of statistical data 
This section presents some background information on institutional practices 
governing public finance in Portuguese municipalities. Democracy was re-established in 
Portugal in April 25, 1974 after 48 years of dictatorship.7 Portuguese municipalities 
were formally established in the 1976 Constitution and the first municipal elections took 
place in December 1976. The panel of data we use comprises all mainland 
municipalities (currently 278), from 1979 to 2000, covering six electoral periods.  
Portuguese local governments are responsible for improving the well-being of 
the populations that live in their territories. They promote social and economic 
development, territory organization, and supply local public goods (water and sewage, 
energy, transportation, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports, environmental 
preservation, and public safety).8  
There are no differences in budgeting rules and institutions across Portuguese 
mainland municipalities,9 however, the law regulating local public finances changed 
several times during the period considered.10 Municipalities are financially autonomous. 
They have their own employees and assets. Each year the executive branch of the 
municipality (town council) proposes a local budget and the plan of activities to the 
legislative branch (municipal assembly). Budgets adopted by the municipal assembly do 
not require the agreement of the national government. As part of the general 
government sector, local authorities are, however, subject to several control 
mechanisms by central government agencies. These, limit their access to revenue and 
their expenditure choices. 
Political business cycles are more likely to occur in expenditure categories 
where the timing of implementation is controlled by the mayor and where the 
expenditures are visible to the electorate. Local Portuguese politicians have more 
freedom to manipulate municipalities’ expenditures than revenues.11 Therefore, our 
analysis concentrates on the former and, in particular, on capital expenditures. Current 
                                                 
7 The number of observations for studies intended to analyze the behavior of Portuguese central 
governments is small. Since the end of the dictatorship there have been only 10 legislative elections in 
Portugal. Research on local governments provides many more degrees of freedom. 
8 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments. 
9 Overseas municipalities, belonging to the islands of Madeira and Azores, are treated differently from 
those in the mainland. 
10 Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, Law 1/87 and, currently, Law 46/98. 
11 Transfers from the Central Administration and the E.U. represent a very important source of funding 
for municipalities. 
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expenditure decisions are subject to greater rigidity. In the current expenditures 
category, items such as salaries do not have enough flexibility to be changed before 
elections because they are regulated by rigid labour contracts, both in terms of duration 
and wage rates. 
Capital expenditures in Portuguese municipalities include investment 
expenditures implemented by the municipality and capital transfers to the counties 
(freguesias). Investment expenditures are divided into seven categories, some with sub-
components: (1) acquisition of land, (2) housing, (3) other buildings, (4) miscellaneous 
construction, (5) transportation material, (6) machinery equipment, and (7) other 
investments. “Other buildings” include: (3.1) sports, recreational and schooling 
infrastructures; (3.2) social equipment; and (3.3) other. The “Miscellaneous 
constructions” category is composed of the following items: (4.1) overpasses, streets 
and complementary work; (4.2) sewage; (4.3) water treatment and distribution; (4.4) 
rural roads; (4.5) infrastructures for solid waste treatment; and (4.6) other. 
Data on the municipalities’ local accounts and population were obtained from 
the local authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais) annual publication called 
Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report exists from 1979 to 1983 and 
from 1986 to 2000. For the two missing years data was obtained directly from the 
municipalities’ official accounts and is incomplete: we have 150 observations for 1984 
and 154 for 1985. Data on the area of municipalities was acquired from the Marktest’s 
Sales Index dataset, the consumer price indexes were taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics, the percentages of the population under 15 and over 
65 years old were obtained in the 1970, 1981 and 1991 Census and in the Anuário 
Estatístico Regional (Regional Statistical Yearbook) of the Portuguese Institute of 
Statistics (INE). 
Political data, namely election dates and municipal electoral results, were 
obtained from the National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) and 
from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado 
Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral) of the Internal Affairs Ministry. It is 
worth noting that election dates are defined exogenously from the perspective of the 
local authorities. Since the re-establishment of Democracy in 1974, there were local 
elections in 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001, always in December. 
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4. Model specification 
 The first empirical model to be implemented uses the budget balance (per 
capita, at 1995 prices) as the dependent variable.12 Since mayors have little control over 
their municipality’s revenues, it is possible that expenditures are more subject to 
political manipulation than budget balances. Thus, a model that has real per capita total 
expenditures, TotExp, as the dependent variable was estimated. But, since current 
expenditures are strongly conditioned by salaries, it is likely that the evidence for 
political business cycles is greater for capital expenditures, CapExp, and, among these, 
for investment expenditures, InvExp (both expressed in real terms, per capita). Thus, 
equations for these types of expenditures were also estimated. 
 
The following explanatory variables are used in these four models: 
• Lagged values of the dependent variable, in order to account for the 
autoregressive component of the time series; 
• TotTransfit is the total of real per capita transfers that the municipality i receives 
during the year t. Given their weight of roughly 70% in the municipalities’ 
revenues, it is anticipated that transfers have a strong positive effect on total 
expenditures, TotExp.  
• CapTransfit, the real per capita capital transfers that municipality i receives 
during year t, are used instead of TotTransfit in the equations for capital 
expenditures (CapExp) and investment expenditures (InvExp).13 Transfers also 
reflect, and allow us to control for, the macroeconomic performance of the 
country. We anticipate that greater transfers allow for greater expenditures; 
• ElectionYearit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in municipal 
election years and zero in non-election years. With this variable we test the 
hypothesis that municipal budget deficits and expenditures are higher in election 
years. Thus, a negative estimated coefficient is expected for ElectionYear in the 
equation for the BudgetBalance and positive signs are expected in the equations 
for TotExp, CapExp and InvExp; 
                                                 
12 For each municipality, the budget balance was divided by the consumer price index for the base year 
(1995) and, then, by its population. The budget balance, based on public accounting, is calculated 
according to the methodology of the General Direction of the Budget (Direcção Geral do Orçamento) of 
the Ministry of Finance, which excludes the transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the totals 
of revenues and expenditures. 
13 Capital transfers account, on average, for 72% of capital expenditures. Descriptive statistics are shown 
in Table 1. 
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• Rightit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the mayor (Presidente 
de Câmara) of municipality i belongs to a right-wing party (PPD/PSD - Social 
Democratic Party or CDS/PP – People’s Party) and zero when she belongs to a 
left-wing party (PS – Socialist Party, PCP/CDU – Portuguese Communist Party 
or PRD – Democratic Renewal Party). With this variable we test for the 
existence of ideological cycles (see Hibbs, 1977) in the budget balances and 
expenditures of Portuguese mainland municipalities; 
• Since real per capita municipal expenditures may be affected by variables such 
as the age structure of the population, population density, geographical location, 
population, etc., the following control variables were included in all estimations: 
o %Pop<15 – Percentage of the population under 15 years old; 
o %Pop>65 - Percentage of the population over 65 years old; 
o PopDens – Population density; 
o Coastline – Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for municipalities 
that belong to districts (Distritos) along the coastline (the richest and 
most developed ones), and zero for those that belong to districts located 
in the interior of the country; 
o PopCat – Population category: 1 – Lisbon and Porto; 2 – other 
municipalities, with population over 40000; 3 – municipalities with 
population between 10000 and 40000; 4 – remaining municipalities.14 
 
(Table 1, Page 17) 
 
The empirical model can be summarized as follows: 
 ititijti
p
j
jit yy ε+ν++α= −
=
∑ βX ' ,,
1
 iTtNi ,...,1  ,...,1 ==  (1) 
where yit is the dependent variable and p is its number of lags included in the model, 
'
itX  is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, νi 
is the individual effect of municipality i, and εit is the error term. 
 Given the presence of individual effects, νi, the model referred to above can be 
estimated assuming that those effects are either fixed or random. But, the lagged value 
                                                 
14 These population categories are used in the legislation to determine the mayors’ salaries. 
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of the dependent variable would be correlated with the error term, εit, even if the latter is 
not serially correlated. This implies inconsistent estimates of the model, when there is a 
clear dominance of cross sections over time periods in the sample.15 This is exactly 
what happens in our panel, in which the number of municipalities (N=278) is about 12 
times larger than the number of years available (T=22). 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator that solves the problems noted above. First differencing (1) removes 
the individual effects (νi) and produces an equation that is estimable by instrumental 
variables: 
 ittijti
p
j
jit yy ε∆+∆+α∆=∆ −
=
∑ βX ' ,,
1
 iTtNi ,...,1  ,...,1 ==  (2) 
The valid instruments are: levels of the dependent variable, lagged two or more 
periods (yi1,…,yit-2); levels of the endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods 
(xi1,…,xit-2); levels of the pre-determined variables, lagged one or more periods (xi1,…,xit-
1); and the levels of the exogenous variables, current or lagged (xi1,…,xit) or, simply, the 
first differences of the exogenous variables (∆xit). 
 More moment conditions are available if we assume that the explanatory 
variables (xit) are uncorrelated with the individual effects (νi). In this case, the first lags 
of these variables (xit-1) can be used as instruments in the levels equation. The 
estimation then combines the set of moment conditions available for the first-
differenced equations with the additional moment conditions implied for the levels 
equations. 
If the level of an explanatory variable xit is correlated with the individual effects 
νi but its first-differences (∆xit) are not, lagged values of the first-differences (∆xit-1) can 
be used as instruments in the equation in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Lagged 
differences of the dependent variable (∆yi,t-1) may also be valid instruments for the 
levels equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this extended GMM estimator is 
preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991) when the dependent variable and/or the 
independent variables are persistent.16 
                                                 
15 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (2001). 
16 Since there is some persistence of expenditures and transfers, it is appropriate to estimate this system-
GMM. Furthermore, difference Sargan tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to 
the GMM that only includes the first-differenced equations. 
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5. Empirical results 
 The estimation results of the models described in the previous section using the 
method system-GMM for linear dynamic panel data models are shown in Table 2. It 
presents the two-step results, using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.17 
T-statistics are presented between parentheses and the degree of statistical significance 
is signalled with asterisks. The number of observations and municipalities is reported at 
the foot of the table.18 
 
 (Table 2, Page 18) 
 
The first lag of the dependent variable is always statistically significant, and it 
was necessary to include a second lag in the investment expenditures equation.19 As 
anticipated, the greater the transfers received by a municipality in a given year, the 
greater are its expenditures: the estimated coefficients associated with TotTransf and 
CapTransf have positive signs in the last three equations.20 
 There is strong evidence of rational opportunistic cycles for the four dependent 
variables considered in Table 2, as ElectionYear is always statistically significant and 
correctly signed. Thus, in municipal election years there are larger budget deficits and 
higher total, capital and investment expenditures than in the other years of the electoral 
cycle. As anticipated, the empirical evidence is relatively weak for the budget balance 
and for total expenditures (for which ElectionYear is only marginally statistically 
significant) and much greater for capital and investment expenditures.21 Results indicate 
                                                 
17 Although it is more common to present the one-step results because the two-step standard errors are 
generally biased downwards, that problem does not apply to our case, since the econometric software 
PcGive 10.2 uses the finite-sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2000). Thus, we present the two-
step results, as these have the advantage of being consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In all 
models, all available instruments were used. 
18 When taking lags and first-differences, the observations for three municipalities created in 1997 
(Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) are dropped, leading to a panel of 275 municipalities and 20 years of 
observations. 
19 The choice of the number of lags to include was based on their statistical significance and on the need 
to avoid second order autocorrelation of the residuals. Although the second lag of InvExp is not 
statistically significant, there is second order autocorrelation of the residuals when it is not included. 
20 Although transfers are exogenous relative to expenditures, their levels are correlated with the individual 
effects. Thus, the once lagged first differences of transfers were used as instruments in the equation in 
levels.  
21 A model for current expenditures was also estimated. Results confirmed our hypothesis that they were 
not subject to opportunistic manipulation, given their greater inertia. Nevertheless, we found evidence 
that left-wing oriented mayors spend more in current expenditures than right-wing ones. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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that, holding all else equal, investment expenditures increased by 2170 Portuguese 
escudos (PTE)22 of 1995 per capita in the election year, a relative increase (compared to 
the sample mean) of 6.8%. Capital expenditures increased by 1138 real escudos (1995 
base year) in the election year (a relative increase of 3.2%).23 
 There is some evidence that ideology affects spending patterns. Deficits and 
capital expenditures are greater for right-wing oriented mayors, total expenditures are 
greater for left-wing oriented mayors, and there is no evidence of ideological effects in 
investment expenditures. Given the diversity of results and the weak statistical 
significance of estimated coefficients, it is not possible to draw general conclusions 
about the character of ideological effects in municipal finances. 
 Some control variables help explain the differences among municipalities in the 
behaviour of budget balances and expenditures: municipalities where the percentage of 
the population under 15 years old is greater have higher surpluses, lower total 
expenditures and higher investment expenditures; a greater percentage of the population 
over 65 years old is associated with greater deficits, but does not seem to affect 
expenditures; budget balances and expenditures do not seem to be affected by the 
population density; municipalities in districts along the coastline have greater 
expenditures per capita, but do not show different budget balances from the 
municipalities in the interior; municipalities with smaller population have lower total 
per capita expenditures, but do not exhibit statistically significant differences from the 
most populous ones regarding budget balances and capital and investment expenditures. 
 In the estimations whose results are shown in Table 3, we tested whether the 
magnitude of the opportunistic cycle in investment expenditures depends on the 
mayor’s ideology, the support she enjoys in the municipal assembly, or on running for 
another term in office.24 In column 1, the variable ElectionYear was interacted with 
dummy variables representing the mayor’ ideology: Right and Left (=1-Right). Results 
suggest that all mayors behave opportunistically, but left-wing oriented ones increase 
their expenditures in the election year by a higher amount than right-wing ones: the 
                                                 
22 2170 PTE = 10.82 euro. The conversion rate is:  1 euro = 200.482 PTE. 
23 The relative changes for the budget balance and total expenditures are of -24% and 2.6%, respectively. 
Although the increase in the deficit indicates a strong opportunistic effect, this results should be 
interpreted with caution, as the estimated coefficient is only marginally statistically significant. 
24 The five control variables were included in all estimations, but their coefficients and t-statistics are not 
shown in order to economize space. Furthermore, the objective of this study is to test for the existence of 
political business cycles, which does not require a detailed analysis of results regarding the control 
variables. 
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estimated coefficient associated with ElectionYear*Left is more than twice that of 
ElectionYear*Right.25 
  
 Table 3, Page 19
 
 In column 2, we checked whether expenditures and the magnitude of the 
opportunistic cycle would be different when the mayor had the support of a majority of 
deputies in the municipal assembly. The dummy variable Majority was included in the 
model, and it takes the value of 1 when the mayor’s party has a majority of deputies in 
the municipal assembly, and zero otherwise. Additionally, the variable ElectionYear 
was interacted with the variables Majority and Minority (=1-Majority). Results indicate 
that a majority induces greater investment expenditures (about 926 escudos per capita), 
but does not affect the magnitude of the opportunistic behaviour.26 
 Rosenberg’s (1992) hypothesis that incumbents that do not run for another term 
in office generate a greater opportunistic cycle than those that do is tested in column 3. 
ElectionYear was interacted with the dummy variables Recand, which equals 1 when 
the mayor runs for another term and zero when she does not, and NoRecand (=1-
Recand). Since a Wald test does not reject the equality of the estimated coefficients, our 
results do not confirm the hypothesis and empirical results obtained by Rosenberg 
(1992) for Israel nor the more conventional hypothesis that a “lame duck” has little 
incentive to produce a political business cycle. 
 Considering that some investments may take several months to be concluded, 
one should expect incumbents to start increasing investment expenditures in the year 
before elections, in order to signal greater competency to the electorate. We tested that 
hypothesis by adding to the model of the last column of Table 2 the dummy variable 
YearBeforeElection, which equals 1 in the year before municipal elections and zero in 
the remaining years. As expected, this variable is statistically significant and has a 
smaller estimated coefficient than ElectionYear27 (see column 4 of Table 3). The model 
of column 5 adds the dummy variable YearLegElection, which equals 1 in a year of 
national legislative elections and zero in the other years. Here, we test the hypothesis 
                                                 
25 A Wald test clearly rejects the equality of estimated coefficients. 
26 A Wald test does not reject the equality of the coefficients associated with ElectionYear*Majority and 
ElectionYear*Minority. 
27 A Wald test rejects the equality of estimated coefficients. 
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that mayors increase expenditures in years of legislative elections to promote a better 
outcome for their parties at the national level. The results support this hypothesis. 
Like Table 2, Table 3 shows little evidence of ideological effects in investment 
expenditures: the variable Right is only marginally statistically significant in the 
estimation of column 1 and is not significant in the other estimations. 
 The next step of the empirical analysis was to determine which types of 
investment expenditures show the greatest sensitivity to the electoral calendar.. The 
model of column 4 of Table 3 was estimated for the seven components of investment 
expenditures (see Table 4). There is evidence of opportunistic cycles for investments in 
Other Buildings, Miscellaneous Constructions and Other Investments, for which there 
are increases in the election year (relative to the sample mean) of 13.6%, 11.5% and 
16.6%, respectively.28 For Miscellaneous Constructions, the increase in expenditures 
starts one year before elections. Concerning partisan effects, right-wing oriented 
incumbents tend to spend relatively more on Acquisition of Land and Miscellaneous 
Constructions (relative increases of 24.3% and 4.9%, respectively), while left-wing 
ones spend relatively more on Transportation Material and Machinery and Equipment 
(relative increases of 11.6% and 14.6%, respectively). 
 
            (Table 4, Page 20)
 
 Given the strong evidence of the existence of political business cycles in the 
components of Other Buildings and of Miscellaneous Constructions,29 we decided to 
analyze their sub-components. In order to economize on space, only the results for the 
sub-components for which there is evidence of opportunistic cycles are presented in 
Table 5.30 Concerning Other Buildings, that only happens for the sub-component Other 
(which has a weight of 53%), for which expenditures increase in the election year and, 
slightly less in the year before (increases of 21.6% and 17.6% relative to the sample 
mean). Concerning the subdivisions of Miscellaneous Constructions, there is clear 
evidence of opportunistic cycles in Overpasses, streets and complementary works, 
                                                 
28 Expenditures on Transportation Material and Machinery and Equipment decrease in election years. 
The opportunistic behavior seems to lead not only to an increase in expenditures in general, but also to 
money transfers from investment components less visible by the electorate to those with greater visibility.  
29 These are the two most important components of investment expenditures, as they jointly account for 
about 83% of the total (Other Investments = 17.3% and Miscellaneous Constructions = 65.6%). 
30 The results for the other sub-components are available upon request. 
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Rural roads, and Other, with increases, relative to the mean, of 14.8%, 16.4% and 
36.8%, respectively. It is worth noting that these three items account for around 69% of 
the expenditures in miscellaneous constructions. For the first and last of these sub-
components, expenditures also increase in the year prior to the election year, although 
by a smaller amount (relative increases of 10.6% and 27.4%, respectively). There is no 
evidence of ideological effects for the sub-components of investment expenditures 
included in Table 5, as the dummy variable Right is never statistically significant. 
 
            (Table 5, Page 21) 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Empirical results provide clear evidence of political business cycles in 
Portuguese municipalities. The finding of such cycles at the local level provides support 
for models of rational opportunistic cycles like that of Rogoff and Sibert (1988). In such 
models, incumbent politicians manipulate economic policy instruments in order to 
reveal greater competence shortly before elections. There is clear evidence that 
municipal budget deficits and expenditures, especially investment expenditures, 
increase in election years and, sometimes, in the year before. This opportunistic 
behaviour focuses on investment expenditures that are highly visible to the electorate, 
such as Other Buildings (particularly in the sub-component Other) and Miscellaneous 
Constructions (specially in Overpasses, streets and complementary works, Rural roads 
and Other). This suggests the intention to signal greater competence in pre-election 
periods.31 The magnitude of the cycle does not seem to depend on the support the mayor 
enjoys in the municipal assembly, nor on the decision to run for another term in office, 
but left-wing oriented incumbents tend to be more opportunistic than right-wing ones. 
As for ideological cycles, it is hard to identify general tendencies, given the 
inconsistency of the results for budget balances, total expenditures and capital 
expenditures. For investment expenditure and for most of its components, there is no 
evidence of partisan effects. 
                                                 
31 In future research we wish to analyze whether these increases in deficits and expenditures before 
elections influence election results. Studies performed at the aggregate level, Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 
2004b), allow us to conclude that both unemployment and inflation affect the vote intentions of the 
Portuguese and the popularity of the main political entities. 
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Politically-induced fluctuations in expenditures lead to inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources, which are harmful to the national economy. If such cycles could 
be prevented by way of new or tougher rules on the management of municipal finances, 
expressed in limits to deficits and accumulation of debt, the result should be an 
improvement  in overall welfare. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N.Obs. Average StandardDeviation Minimum Maximum
Budget balance and expenditure items:   
Budget balance 5809 -3.51 14.71 -210.92 185.44
Total expenditures 5797 68.49 42.25 2.29 841.33
Capital expenditures 5749 36.04 24.48 .72 287.96
Investment expenditures 5743 31.81 22.51 1.78 288.51
Acquisition of land 5472 .91 1.84 0 40.99
Housing 5473 1.89 4.64 0 100.98
Other buildings 4449 5.51 6.40 0 80.65
Sports, recreational and schooling facilities 5473 1.98 3.71 0 59.73
Social equipment 5468 .32 1.37 0 41.75
Other 4424 2.94 4.62 0 61.36
Miscellaneous constructions 4449 20.89 17.87 0 214.70
Overpasses, streets and complementary 
works 5470 4.41 5.83 0 84.23
Sewage 4450 2.38 3.90 0 69.10
Water treatment and distribution 4450 2.95 4.91 0 100.28
Rural roads 5474 5.91 8.79 0 152.86
Infrastructures for solid waste treatment 4442 .22 2.08 0 98.91
Other 4175 4.02 6.88 0 122.25
Transportation material 4449 .99 1.32 0 15.64
Machinery and equipment 5475 1.91 2.01 0 25.79
Other investments 5195 .85 2.87 0 52.99
Transfers:   
Total transfers 5664 50.89 38.87 4.53 443.29
Capital transfers 5741 26.06 19.48 3.04 249.74
Political variables:   
ElectionYear 6116 .27 .44 0 1
YearBeforeElection 6116 .27 .44 0 1
Right 6049 .47 .50 0 1
ElectionYear*Right 6049 .13 .34 0 1
ElectionYear*Left 6049 .14 .35 0 1
Majority 6049 .59 .49 0 1
ElectionYear*Majority 6049 .15 .36 0 1
ElectionYear*Minority 6049 .12 .32 0 1
ElectionYear*Recand 5923 .21 .40 0 1
ElectionYear*NoRecand 5923 .05 .22 0 1
YearLegElection 6056 .36 .48 0 1
Sources: DGAL, OCDE, STAPE and municipal official accounts. 
Note:  The budget balance, the expenditures and the transfers are always expressed in thousands of 
Portuguese escudos (at 1995 prices) per capita. 
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Table 2: Political Business Cycles in Local Finances 
 Budget 
Balance 
Total 
Expenditures
Capital 
Expenditures
Investment 
Expenditures
BudgetBalance (-1) .126 
(4.36)*** 
   
TotExp (-1)  .445 
(8.59)*** 
  
CapExp (-1)   .279 
(9.31)*** 
 
InvExp (-1)    .324 
(10.9)*** 
InvExp (-2)    -.036 
(-1.45) 
TotTransf  .537 
(6.41)*** 
  
CapTransf   .845 
(15.5)*** 
.802 
(23.9)*** 
ElectionYear -.860 
(-1.90)* 
1.787 
(1.83)* 
1.138 
(3.53)*** 
2.170 
(6.16)*** 
Right -.748 
(-1.84)* 
-2.464 
(-1.95)* 
1.314 
(2.02)** 
.495 
(.90) 
%Pop < 15 .269 
(3.58)*** 
-1.229 
(-6.66)*** 
-.102 
(-1.04) 
.315 
(3.61)*** 
%Pop > 65 -.123 
(-1.74)* 
.051 
(.22) 
-.053 
(-.43) 
-.025 
(-.23) 
PopDens -.0002 
(-.84) 
.001 
(.97) 
.0005 
(.70) 
.0009 
(1.19) 
Coastline .013 
(.04) 
5.029 
(3.00)*** 
2.458 
(3.03)*** 
1.893 
(2.55)** 
PopCat -.534 
(-1.59) 
-3.244 
(-2.47)*** 
-.849 
(-1.20) 
-.003 
(-.005) 
No. Observations 5397 5246 5298 4858 
No. Municipalities 275 275 275 275 
Sources: DGAL, STAPE and OCDE. 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the 
equations in first-differences with the equations in levels), using the econometric 
software PcGive 10.2; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis 
is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; 
- The “Sargan test” is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected 
and Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. 
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Table 3: Political Business Cycles in Investment Expenditures 
InvExp 1 2 3 4 5 
InvExp (-1) .326 
(11.1)*** 
.322 
(10.8)*** 
.350 
(10.5)*** 
.326 
(11.0)*** 
.331 
(11.2)*** 
InvExp (-2) -.035 
(-1.39) 
-.037 
(-1.50) 
-.052 
(-2.06)** 
-.020 
(-.78) 
-.029 
(-1.06) 
CapTransf .800 
(23.9)*** 
.803 
(23.8)*** 
.770 
(18.5)*** 
.792 
(23.4)*** 
.791 
(23.4)*** 
Right .998 
(1.75)* 
.563 
(.99) 
.614 
(1.10) 
.415 
(.76) 
.456 
(.83) 
ElectionYear*Right 1.154 
(2.68)*** 
    
ElectionYear*Left 3.211 
(6.21)*** 
    
Majority  .926 
(1.96)** 
   
ElectionYear*Majority  2.079 
(3.96)*** 
   
ElectionYear*Minority  2.294 
(5.71)*** 
   
ElectionYear*Recand   2.263 
(5.91)*** 
  
ElectionYear*NoRecand   1.567 
(2.17)** 
  
ElectionYear    3.222 
(8.24)*** 
3.584 
(8.66)*** 
YearBeforeElection    2.406 
(8.03)*** 
2.896 
(7.72)*** 
YearLegElection     .824 
(2.29)** 
No. Observations 4858 4858 4806 4858 4858 
No. Municipalities 275 275 275 275 275 
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OCDE and INE. 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in 
first-differences with the equations in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 10.2; 
- The coefficients and t-statistics for the five control variables %Pop<15, %Pop>65, 
PopDens, Coastline and PopCat (included in all estimations) are not shown in order to 
economize space; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; 
- The “Sargan test” is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and 
Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. 
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Table 4: Political Business Cycles in Investment Expenditures Components 
 Acquisition 
of Land 
Housing Other 
Buildings 
Miscellaneous 
Constructions 
Transportation
Material 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
Other 
Investments 
Dep.Variable (-1) .227 
(2.75)*** 
.417 
(8.91)*** 
.374 
(9.62)*** 
.289 
(9.69)*** 
.083 
(2.77)*** 
.247 
(5.19)*** 
.098 
(2.71)*** 
Dep. Variable (-2)  -.139 
(-3.78)*** 
 -.082 
(-3.42)*** 
  .057 
(2.07)** 
CapTransf .024 
(4.72)*** 
.031 
(3.48)*** 
.141 
(7.26)*** 
.594 
(13.7)*** 
.002 
(.61) 
.030 
(5.68)*** 
.020 
(4.04)*** 
ElectionYear -.099 
(-1.54) 
.094 
(.63) 
.749 
(3.83)*** 
2.396 
(6.60)*** 
-.109 
(-2.77)*** 
-.137 
(-2.60)*** 
.142 
(2.33)** 
YearBeforeElection .057 
(1.00) 
.076 
(.61) 
.178 
(.99) 
1.387 
(4.70)*** 
.053 
(1.44) 
-.046 
(-.87) 
.095 
(1.62) 
Right .221 
(3.18)*** 
.049 
(.27) 
-.041 
(-.17) 
1.013 
(1.74)* 
-.115 
(-1.89)* 
-.279 
(-3.78)*** 
-.068 
(-.77) 
No. Observations 4805 4230 4083 3807 4080 4813 3713 
No. Municipalities 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OCDE and INE. 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equation in levels), using the 
econometric software PcGive 10.2; 
- The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables %Pop<15, %Pop>65, PopDens, Coastline and PopCat (included in all estimations) are not 
shown in order to economize space; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; 
- The “Sargan test” is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions. 
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Table 5: Sub-components of Investment Expenditures for which there is evidence of 
Political Business Cycles 
 
Component: Other Buildings  Miscellaneous Constructions 
Sub-component: Other  
Overpasses, streets  
and complementary 
works 
Rural roads Other 
Dep. Variable (-1) .303 
(6.01)*** 
 .389 
(4.65)*** 
.384 
(10.4)*** 
.359 
(6.03)*** 
CapTransf .065 
(4.26)*** 
 .094 
(3.93)*** 
.146 
(5.60)*** 
.167 
(5.68)*** 
ElectionYear .633 
(4.12)*** 
 .653 
(3.38)*** 
.970 
(4.04)*** 
1.477 
(5.87)*** 
YearBeforeElection .518 
(3.94)*** 
 .468 
(2.90)*** 
.169 
(1.03) 
1.099 
(4.79)*** 
Right .023 
(.13) 
 .336 
(1.51) 
.316 
(.78) 
-.268 
(-.99) 
No. Observations 4080  4801 4809 3682 
No. Municipalities 275  275 275 275 
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OCDE and INE. 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-
differences with the equation in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 10.2; 
- The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables %Pop<15, %Pop>65, PopDens, 
Coastline and PopCat (included in all estimations) are not shown in order to economize space; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; 
- The “Sargan test” is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; 
- The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and Sargan 
tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. 
 
